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similarities across the four specialty areas include a normative 
approach, that is, a desire to elucidate what ought to be done; 
respect for those served, whether individuals, communities, 
or both; and the need for a decision-making process that con-
siders questions with unclear ethical solutions by using an 
established framework steeped in a common set of principles 
that guide the decision-makers through evidence, ethical con-
siderations, and scenario shifts to arrive at a path forward.  
We developed pedagogical materials with these various 
bioethics specialties in mind. The materials are designed to 
lead students through an exploration of foundational con-
cepts, applied to contemporary bioethical concerns. The fo-
cus is on skill building, decision-making, and incorporation 
of an ethical perspective into daily work, all of which apply 
in each specialty area. Some materials might lend themselves 
more to one area than another, but the intent is to develop 
tools that will be useful in all four areas. 
All bioethics commission materials are available for free 
downloading at bioethics.gov. Feedback, including success 
stories instructors are willing to share with others, is wel-
comed at education@bioethics.gov.
Disclaimer 
The findings and conclusions in this paper are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of 
the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues 
or the Department of Health and Human Services.
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Michael Bloomberg assumed office as the 108th mayor of New York City on January 1, 2002. As he leaves the mayoralty—having won re-election 
twice—his public health legacy is bitterly contested. The 
public health community views him as an urban innovator—
a rare political and business leader willing to fight for a built 
environment conducive to healthier, safer lifestyles. To his de-
tractors, Bloomberg epitomizes a meddling nanny—an elitist 
dictating to largely poor and working-class people about how 
they ought to lead their lives. His policies have sparked in-
tense public, corporate, and political ire—critical of sweeping 
mayoral power to socially engineer the city and its inhabit-
ants.
Here, I seek to show how Bloomberg has fundamentally 
changed public health policy and discourse. He has used the 
engine of government to make New York City a laboratory 
for innovation—raising the visibility of public health, test-
ing policy effectiveness, and probing the boundaries of state 
power. Even though the courts have blocked some of his 
boldest initiatives, he has offered a paradigm for the “new 
public health”—reaching beyond infectious diseases to up-
stream risk factors in everyday life and the human habitat. 
I also critically probe various arguments designed to derail 
his policies, along with the overarching charge of unjustified 
paternalism. (A graphic categorizing his major health policies 
appears in the online version of HCR and on the O’Neill 
Institute website.)
Bloomberg’s Health 
Legacy:  
Urban Innovator or 
Meddling Nanny?
by LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN
Lawrence O. Gostin, “Bloomberg’s Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Med-
dling Nanny?” Hastings Center Report 43, no. 5 (2013): 19-25. DOI: 10.1002/
hast.208
20   HASTINGS CENTER REPORT September-October 2013
Diet and Nutrition: Addressing the Root Causes of 
Obesity
Mirroring national trends, being overweight or obese is now the norm in New York City (58 percent of adults 
across the city), with black, Latino, and low-income com-
munities the most heavily affected and obesity rates reaching 
70 percent in the poorest neighborhoods.1 Perhaps more dis-
turbing is that 40 percent of the city’s youth are overweight 
or obese, compared to 33.2 percent nationally.2 If the trend is 
not reversed, today’s generation could live shorter lives than 
their parents. This stark reality forces society to face critical 
questions: does government have an obligation to reduce 
obesity, what combination of interventions work, and at what 
cost to personal freedom?
Trans fat ban. Are some products so hazardous to health 
that they should be removed from the market? Artificial trans 
fatty acids provide no health benefit and are unsafe at any 
consumption level.3 In 2006, the city required that any food 
served to customers (unless in a sealed package) contain less 
than 0.5 grams of trans fat per serving, and many cities have 
followed suit—notice, however, that even half a gram of trans 
fat per serving is unhealthy, especially if consumers eat mul-
tiple servings during the course of a day.
Although the trans fat limit received a warmer public re-
sponse than other diet-related policies, it still met opposition 
from restaurants and civil libertarians. Economic interests 
drove much of the debate, with claims it would raise food 
prices, thus affecting employment and consumers. Consum-
ers feared the ban would affect the taste of baked goods and 
argued that the state should not dictate what people eat. But 
after a half-decade of experience, the fears proved unfound-
ed, with no attributable rise in food prices or noticeable dif-
ference in taste. The lesson may be that if products change 
in ways that make people healthier (less trans fat, sugar, or 
sodium), public tastes will often adapt. Sites in the United 
States and globally have followed the New York model, and 
low trans fat has now become a widely accepted norm.
Menu labeling. The Board of Health in 2006 required res-
taurants that voluntarily disclosed calorie information to post 
calories in standard form. The New York State Restaurant As-
sociation challenged the regulation, alleging that federal law 
preempted the board’s action. The court agreed, but only be-
cause the statute did not apply uniformly to all chain restau-
rants.4 A revised regulation, enacted in 2008, addressed the 
court’s concerns by requiring all chain restaurants to disclose 
calories on menus and menu boards. The NYSRA then chal-
lenged the amended regulation under the First Amendment, 
but the Second Circuit found that compelled disclosure of 
truthful, objective information did not violate the commer-
cial speech doctrine.5
Menu labeling facilitates informed decision-making. In-
dividuals underestimate the caloric content of food and, on 
average, consume more than one-third of their calories away 
from home.6 Most studies, however, show that posting calo-
ries has little effect on aggregate purchasing decisions.7 This 
may be attributable, in part, to the failure to provide context. 
Researchers suggest that providing a physical activity equiv-
alent (for example, 450 calories = 80 minutes of running) 
would be more effective.8
Despite the scientific uncertainty, many cities have fol-
lowed New York’s model. Nationally, the Affordable Care 
Act will require all chains with more than twenty locations to 
post calorie counts and recommended daily intake. The U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration’s proposed rule is less rigor-
ous than New York’s—for example, it applies only to food 
services, excluding those in movie theaters and amusement 
parks; worse still, the ACA may preempt more stringent local 
requirements.
National Salt Reduction Initiative. New York launched 
the NSRI—a public-private partnership of over ninety health 
agencies and associations—in 2009. Companies voluntari-
ly pledged to reduce sodium by 20 percent in overall sales 
within a given food category (canned soup, for example) by 
2014. This left ample room for high-sodium foods provided 
the producer offset these with low-sodium alternatives within 
the category. Many companies have joined the NSRI, with 
twenty-one meeting the 2012 sodium goals.9
Americans consume over twice the daily-recommended 
1,500 mg of sodium, increasing blood pressure. Excess salt 
intake is associated with 136,000 deaths per year, and a small 
reduction could prevent many of these deaths, saving $10-24 
billion annually in medical costs.10 Little of the sodium excess 
comes from the shaker—80 percent is added to prepared or 
packaged foods. The problem, then, is not primarily behav-
ioral but, rather, lies in food manufacturing and marketing. 
Gradually reducing sodium content early in the supply chain 
could alter eating habits, with major health benefits. The 
NSRI offers an illustration of a public-private partnership 
to tackle a health problem. Self-regulation may be a useful 
way to improve health, but only if government is prepared to 
regulate if voluntary approaches prove unsuccessful.
Sugary drink portion limits. Soft drink portion sizes have 
grown dramatically, along with Americans’ waistlines. A 
twelve-ounce soda that was “king-size” in 1950 is now mar-
keted as a child portion. A “large” Coca-Cola at McDonald’s 
is thirty-two ounces, while 7-Eleven’s Double Gulp contains 
fifty ounces, six hundred calories, and no nutritional value. 
Sugar-sweetened drinks account for a substantial portion of 
increased caloric intake.11 Children are particularly vulner-
able—for every sweetened beverage a child drinks daily, her 
odds of becoming obese increase by 60 percent.12 To curb 
consumption, the Board of Health proscribed serving sizes of 
more than sixteen ounces for sweetened beverages that con-
tain over twenty-five calories per eight ounces. The rule ex-
cluded beverages containing alcohol or more than 50 percent 
milk, and it did not cover state-regulated businesses—includ-
ing 7-Eleven.
The beverage size limit has come to represent Bloomberg’s 
so-called Nanny State. Amid intense publicity, polls regis-
tered disapproval both within the city and nationally. Missis-
sippi—the most obese state—prohibited local communities 
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from mandating calorie counts or portion size caps. 
However, it was a legal challenge rather than a political 
one that delayed (and perhaps blocked) implementation 
of the rule. A trial judge ruled that the Board of Health 
lacked the power to enact the rule, which properly resided 
with the elected City Council. Characterizing the policy 
as an “administrative Leviathan,” the court also deemed 
it “arbitrary and capricious” and laden with exceptions.13 
On July 30, 2013, the appellate division upheld the deci-
sion, ruling that the Board of Health had the power to 
ban “inherently harmful” foods but that sweetened bever-
ages did not fall into that category.14 Although the city 
appealed, its prospects for 
success appear dim.
Disease surveillance. 
Striking a balance be-
tween surveillance and 
privacy has proved a pe-
rennial challenge for pub-
lic health. Historically, 
surveillance efforts have 
primarily tracked infec-
tious diseases, but public 
health agencies now seek 
to extend monitoring to 
chronic diseases. Critics 
of the policy have voiced 
misgivings about whether 
citizens’ privacy may be 
invaded to alter primarily 
self-regarding behavior.
Bloomberg introduced 
two contentious surveil-
lance programs, for HIV 
and diabetes, respectively. 
The diabetes initiative, discussed here, was the first of its 
kind. Diabetes prevalence in New York leapt from 3.7 
percent to 9.2 percent between 1994 and 2004.15 In re-
sponse, the city declared diabetes an epidemic, requiring 
laboratories to report hemoglobin A1C test results to the 
health department, which then informed treating physi-
cians and patients with elevated blood sugar. Civil lib-
ertarians objected to the system’s opt-out structure—any 
patient who did not actively object would receive the 
data. Yet 43 percent of patients stated they would use the 
data, with many scheduling medical appointments.16 The 
city’s intent was also to advise physicians about better dia-
betes management. The program is one of the first uses 
of surveillance that not only tracks a chronic, noncom-
municable disease but also links the data to concrete in-
terventions. It bridges the historic divide between public 
health and medicine, thus offering pathways for future 
programs.
Physical Activity: Transforming the Built 
Environment
Living a sedentary lifestyle is a powerful contributor to chronic disease and early death, and physical activ-
ity in the United States has declined by 40 percent since 
1965.17 In New York City, 75 percent of adults fail to 
meet the recommended minimums for exercise.18 Bloom-
berg has sought to structure the built environment to en-
courage active lifestyles, making it easier to walk, play, 
and recreate.
Facilitating bicycle use. New York City has added 
386 miles of bicycle lanes 
since 2006, making resi-
dents more active. Bicycle 
riding has risen dramati-
cally, doubling between 
2007 and 2011.19 In May 
2013, the city partnered 
with a private company 
to launch its bike share 
program, Citi Bike, pro-
viding 6,000 bicycles at 
330 stations throughout 
Manhattan and Brook-
lyn. Within a month, the 
system attracted about 
450,000 total trips and 
46,840 annual members; 
72 percent of City resi-
dents support bike shar-
ing.20 Bicycle riding poses 
a tradeoff between im-
proved fitness and higher 
injury rates, but safety im-
proves as cycling reaches a critical mass. At the same time, 
many motorists bristle at the perceived preference given 
to bicyclists, together with their propensity to ignore traf-
fic rules. Making cities bicycle friendly flies in the face of 
the historical governmental preference given to cars and 
roads. Yet, it signals that recreation and alternative trans-
portation are integral to active urban lifestyles.
Pedestrian paths and parks. Even casual observers can-
not fail to see the flow of walkers, joggers, and skaters 
milling around the city. The increase in physical move-
ment occurred partly by design through expansion of 
public spaces and pedestrian accessibility—parks, green 
spaces, and integrated pedestrian walkways. The High 
Line—a lively, attractive walkway built on an abandoned 
elevated rail line on Manhattan’s West Side—attracts mil-
lions of users, revitalizing neighborhoods. Security is a 
significant factor in encouraging activity. The major re-
duction in crime, together with safety programs (such as 
Safe Routes to Schools and Safe Streets for Seniors) has 
worked wonders. Higher curbs, safer bus stop locations, 
and pedestrian-only streets make residents feel more 
Bloomberg’s contentious  
diabetes program is one of 
the first uses of surveillance 
that not only tracks a  
chronic, noncommunicable 
disease but also links the 
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secure. The city’s progress continues, with plans to convert 
the Fresh Kills Landfill into a park three times larger than 
Central Park;  the city intends to have a park within a ten-
minute walk of every resident by 2030.
Tobacco Control: Curbing the Largest Preventable 
Cause of Premature Mortality
At the turn of the millennium, smoking took nearly 9,000 lives annually in New York City,  and it remains the lead-
ing cause of preventable death. Half of the city’s 1.3 million 
smokers were expected to die prematurely from tobacco-re-
lated diseases. The toll fell disproportionately on minorities 
and the poor. These grim facts motivated the mayor’s office 
to develop a suite of tobacco control policies, and the results 
have been remarkable. Between 2002 and 2011, the rate of 
smoking fell from 21.5 percent to 14.8 percent among adults, 
and from 17.5 percent to 8.5 percent among youth.21
Smoke-free laws. Smoke-filled rooms were the norm when 
Bloomberg took office. In 2002, 57 percent of city food 
workers spent most of their waking hours inhaling second-
hand smoke, increasing their cancer risk by 50 percent. That 
year, New York City banned smoking in all restaurants and 
bars. The environmental effects were powerful: just one year 
later, cotinine concentrations—a biomarker to detect nico-
tine exposure—decreased by 83 percent, and tobacco-related 
symptoms decreased from 88 percent to 38 percent.22 Vocif-
erous protests by businesses that the ban would drive custom-
ers away proved unfounded; patrons welcomed the change. 
The city’s Smoke-Free Act changed norms nationwide. At the 
time, only California and a few cities had smoke-free laws, 
but now over 80 percent of Americans are protected by such 
statutes.
The mayor went further in 2011 by extending the smok-
ing ban to parks, beaches, and pedestrian plazas. Side-stream 
smoke poses a much lower risk in outdoor spaces, and ban-
ning cigarettes outdoors is highly paternalistic. But even 
though the ban is not rigorously enforced, it has reinforced 
the culture of a smoke-free environment. Smoking has be-
come culturally unacceptable, and the regulation has wide 
public support.23 
Cigarette taxes. Raising cigarette prices reduces smoking, 
especially among young people: for every 10 percent rise in 
price, youth smoke 7 percent less.24 In 2002, New York City 
increased the tax per pack from $0.08 to $1.50. At first, many 
smokers avoided the tax by buying in adjacent jurisdictions, 
but over time the avoidance behavior subsided. The tax is 
regressive, since smokers are disproportionately poor and 
working class. Yet the resulting benefits of reduced smoking 
are distributed progressively—a tradeoff between economic 
justice and health justice.
Marketing restrictions. In 2009, the city required retailers 
to display graphic warnings with images of cancerous lungs, 
decayed teeth, or stroke-damaged brains. The regulation nev-
er went into effect, however; the Second Circuit ruled that 
federal law preempted the local regulation.25 Fast-forward to 
2013: the United States and other countries have proposed 
graphic labeling. These proposals, too, are bitterly contest-
ed; Big Tobacco claims that they violate commercial speech 
rights and take property without just compensation.
Undaunted by the setback, Bloomberg sought other ways 
to discourage tobacco purchases at the point of sale. In March 
2013, citing continuing youth smoking, he proposed a ban 
on openly displaying cigarettes in stores, although retailers 
could still advertise products and price information. The next 
month, Bloomberg proposed an increase in the minimum 
age for buying tobacco from eighteen to twenty-one, which 
would give New York City the strictest age limits in the na-
tion. Both proposals are awaiting City Council endorsement.
Probing the Critiques of Bloomberg’s Policies
A familiar litany of critiques shadows any novel public health policy: the science is inconclusive, freedom of 
choice is constrained, the executive is exercising unilateral 
power, beware slippery slopes, corporations have rights, and 
justice demands protecting the vulnerable against state inter-
ference. These might be framed as general justifications for 
governmental restraint. They are the antithesis of the public 
health approach, which urges government to act in the face of 
enduring injury and disease.
Inconclusive science. Critics invariably challenge chronic 
disease policies as lacking sufficient evidence of effectiveness. 
At the most extreme, they demand conclusive proof—charg-
ing, for example, that the science behind the trans fat ban is 
“not indubitable.”26 Science seldom reaches universal agree-
ment, of course, least of all on the causation of complex, mul-
tifactorial diseases. Rarely are policy-makers in other domains 
expected to demonstrate a certainty, or even a high probabil-
ity, of “success.” In most policy spheres, such as economic 
policy, we understand that causal relationships are difficult 
to demonstrate, but critics often demand it of public health.
Yet, a reasonable level of logic and research guides all of 
Bloomberg’s interventions. Even with the soda portion limit 
(perhaps the hardest case), the mayor relied on science to sup-
port a creative, untested strategy: sugary drinks deliver empty 
calories, with a direct relationship to obesity, while portion 
sizes have grown exponentially. Society cannot know what 
works until commonsense ideas are tested.
Related to the demand for scientific certainty is the de-
mand for consistency, illustrated by the criticism that the 
soda portion limit applies to McDonald’s supersized drinks 
but not to 7-Eleven’s Big Gulps. In fact, few policies are per-
fectly consistent; rather, they are crafted as political compro-
mises, and politics is the art of the possible, not the perfect. 
Essentially, critics are saying, “We hate the portion size ban 
for its nanny intrusiveness, but it won’t work because it’s rid-
dled with exceptions.” The implication is that critics would 
accept the limit if it applied more broadly, which clearly is 
not their intent. A direct tax on sugary drinks would have 
been a more logical intervention than portion control, but 
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New York State has been unwilling to institute one, despite 
Bloomberg’s requests.
Finally, critics demand that each intervention be proven in 
isolation, but the more rational question is whether a suite of 
policies has a reasonable chance of working. Tobacco policies, 
for example, have dramatically reduced smoking over several 
decades. But we have great difficulty measuring the efficacy of 
any single intervention. Rather, a range of policies (taxes, la-
beling, smoke-free laws, and advertising restrictions) worked 
in combination over time to denormalize smoking.
Paternalism. The societal discomfort with Bloomberg’s 
agenda is grounded, at its core, in distrust of government in-
fluence on how autonomous adults conduct their lives. The 
city’s health policies intrude 
on personal space. Many be-
lieve that the state should not 
assume responsibility for self-
regarding decisions, whether 
by shaping individual dietary 
preferences (trans fats and 
portion sizes) or monitoring 
individuals’ health status (dis-
ease surveillance). 
American antipathy to-
ward paternalism drives 
policy-makers to try to jus-
tify interventions under the 
harm principle—to argue, 
for example, that secondhand 
smoke, increased medical 
costs, and lost productivity 
amount to harm to others 
and so are not purely self-
regarding. Third-party harms 
are not imaginary, but the real policy intent is simply to ease 
the grave burdens of diabetes, heart disease, cancer, and em-
physema. Health officials genuinely believe it is unwise for in-
dividuals to smoke, overeat, live sedentary lives, or do myriad 
other things that cause them suffering and early death.
More importantly, Bloomberg’s policies are not all that in-
trusive, and certainly not as burdensome as the underlying 
diseases. Policies to promote good nutrition and physical ac-
tivity and control the use of tobacco are not morally equiva-
lent to quarantines or forced treatment. Often, they represent 
nothing more than a return to the social norms of the recent 
past—such as smaller food portions and more livable spaces. 
Other interventions, such as limiting advertising to children 
or the reduction of trans fat, sodium, and sugar, actively cre-
ate a “new normal.” Once implemented, many interventions 
are embraced; few of us are nostalgic for the days of smoke-
filled restaurants and workplaces.
The underlying point here is that personal choice is al-
ways conditioned by social circumstances in various ways. 
The public health approach rejects the idea that there is such 
a thing as unfettered free will, recognizing instead that the 
built environment, social networks, marketing, and a range 
of situational cues drive complex behaviors. There are rea-
sons, beyond personal responsibility, that health outcomes 
skew drastically by socioeconomic status. The job of public 
health is to make healthy living the easier choice.
The real burden is on industry, not on consumers. One 
can see this vividly in New York City, where food makers 
funded public opposition to the soda portion ban.
Corporate rights. The corporate sector tries to conflate 
the public’s interests with its own economic interests. Busi-
nesses claim that consumers have a right to smoke, eat, or 
drink their products, however unhealthy the products may 
be. This defense of consumer rights may wrongly imply that 
corporations are being socially responsible. Where their pos-
turing as champions of con-
sumer rights fails, companies 
invoke their own liberties. 
When government tells cor-
porations what they must or 
must not say (through label-
ing requirements or market-
ing restrictions, for example), 
businesses clothe themselves 
in the First Amendment. 
The menu labeling challenges 
have thus far failed, with the 
Second Circuit reasoning that 
New York City does not force 
restaurants to take any posi-
tion or prevent them from 
contesting the city’s views.
Big Tobacco repeatedly 
asserts the right to market 
hazardous products. In 2012, 
the industry challenged a city 
requirement to place graphic images on cigarette packages. 
The court never reached a decision on the merits, however, 
holding that federal law preempted the city’s action.27 At the 
national level, the courts are split over the constitutionality 
of graphic warning labels. In response, the FDA withdrew its 
rule, promising to reissue a revised version.
The mayor’s most recent tobacco initiative—forcing re-
tailers to keep tobacco products hidden from the public’s 
view—will provoke another First Amendment challenge. 
Bloomberg’s intent was to shield children from marketing 
and to prevent impulse buying by former smokers. The Con-
venience Store Association called the bill “patently absurd,” 
stating that “no other retail business licensed to sell legal 
products is required to hide them from its customers.” Big 
Tobacco earlier sued Haverstraw in Rockland County, New 
York, over a similar display ban, but the village could not 
afford a defense, so it simply repealed the ordinance. New 
York City will certainly defend the rule, forcing a judicial pro-
cess about the clash of values between health and the First 
Amendment.
Unilateral executive power. It takes a great deal of political 
capital to enact legislation affecting personal lifestyles. Never 
Policies to promote good  
nutrition and physical 
activity and to control the 
use of tobacco are not  
morally equivalent to  
quarantines or forced  
treatment. 
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known as a patient man, Bloomberg has tested the limits of 
mayoral authority. The trial court in the soda portion case 
remarked that, by bypassing the elected city council, he had 
“eviscerated” the separation of powers. Courts blocked several 
other Bloomberg initiatives (such as limits on vehicle emis-
sions) due to questions of procedure and authority. He has 
issued more executive orders than mayors Koch and Giuliani 
combined. His design changes in the city streetscape (pedes-
trian plazas and bike lanes) began as pilot projects, with no 
public hearings.
Some regard Bloomberg as an urban innovator for over-
coming political paralysis, but others see a failure of trans-
parency and accountability. The Board of Health (which 
adopted policies such as the soda portion ban) has greater 
expertise, but its members are unelected and answerable pri-
marily to the mayor. Those concerned with procedural regu-
larity condemn the exercise of unilateral power, while those 
seeking health improvements welcome strong leadership. 
Undoubtedly, checks and balances are valuable elements of a 
robust democracy. The question is whether a chief executive 
has a duty to cut through political logjams to achieve collec-
tive goods or whether working within the legislative structure 
is always required.
Slippery slopes. Critics often worry that if a particular pol-
icy is implemented, it will lead to ever more invasive policies 
in the future. For example, banning trans fats or restricting 
sugary drink sizes opens the door to regulating any unhealthy 
food. A host of vested corporate interests—the sugar, alcohol, 
and tobacco industries, along with restaurants and advertis-
ers—can make common cause around slippery slope con-
cerns. All of these groups stand to lose if health is placed at 
the center of public policy.
Slippery slope arguments should be approached with sus-
picion, as they force a speculative analysis without any specif-
ics about the policy feared to lie downslope, or the likelihood 
of its being manifest. The task of policy-makers is to delineate 
which policies are acceptable and which are not. Their adop-
tion of any given policy does not suggest that they will extend 
the same reasoning in other realms. It should not be necessary 
to win a debate today about policies that may, or may not, be 
proposed in the future.28
Slippery slope arguments, moreover, lack normative force 
because all sides in a debate can level them. A move in the di-
rection of antipaternalism, for example, could set government 
on a slippery slope toward neglecting acute health problems. 
Policy-making is about striking a reasonable balance based on 
available evidence.
Dueling conceptions of justice. Because obesity- and tobac-
co-related diseases fall primarily on African Americans, La-
tinos, and the working class, interventions necessarily apply 
disproportionately to those groups. This means, of course, 
that any intrusion on autonomy or privacy will fall primar-
ily on the vulnerable. Diabetes registers, for example, mostly 
keep track of lower-income patients, raising a concern about 
justice. Tobacco taxes are regressive, which liberals normally 
oppose. Industry and civil libertarians have joined together 
to decry the injustice of health measures that tread dispropor-
tionately on the liberty of the poor and minorities.
This is a curious conception of justice, however, because 
it focuses solely on the fair distribution of the downsides of 
obesity or tobacco policies—that is, limits on liberty. The jus-
tice argument fails miserably in weighing the corresponding 
health benefits to the poor. Government’s failure to act to 
reduce the suffering and early death visited mostly in poor 
neighborhoods is the far greater injustice. Suppose that the 
ban on trans fats or soda portions facilitates healthier diets, 
that cigarette taxes reduce smoking, or that surveillance re-
sults in better diabetes management. If those policies work, 
a negligible limit on personal choice seems a very small price 
to pay for ameliorating the devastation to the individual and 
families from chronic diseases. The opportunity for a healthy 
life is the primary freedom, as it underwrites so many of life’s 
options.
The “New” Public Health
The “new” public health—focusing on upstream risk fac-tors in everyday life—is not a passing fad or the preoc-
cupation of a lone politician. It is rather a sober and necessary 
response to an epidemiological transition to lifestyle-related 
diseases. If Bloomberg’s passion inspires and accelerates in-
novative public health throughout the nation and globally, he 
will leave office with an enviable legacy.
With the deep challenges posed by complex multifacto-
rial diseases, there are simply no tried and tested solutions. 
The new public health requires experimentation based on 
available science—with all of the attendant uncertainties and 
missteps. If American culture cannot escape from its reflexive 
antipathy to any form of paternalism, the criticisms leveled 
against Bloomberg will persist in our political discourse.
It is no accident that these critiques are so often bundled. 
Once a measure has been tarred as “paternalistic,” it is sub-
jected to intensified scrutiny. The easy course is to watch idly 
while devastating diseases rob people, particularly the poor, of 
healthy years. The harder course is to adopt novel (sometimes 
unpopular) policies to encourage healthier choices.
Governments should be held accountable for the health of 
their inhabitants. Those who disrupt the status quo, however, 
are not the only ones who must shoulder the burden of ac-
countability. Public officials have largely stood by as obesity 
rates have skyrocketed. While the mayor has drawn fierce 
criticism and legal challenges, there has been scant account-
ability for government inaction.
Progress will be piecemeal, through experiments and in-
cremental steps that are embraced gradually. This can be 
uninviting work for politicians, who fixate on the next elec-
tion cycle. The public health community should take time to 
recognize and defend its champions—and Mayor Bloomberg 
undoubtedly is among our most courageous and creative ad-
vocates for a healthier and safer population.
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